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GWALTNEY OF SMITHFIELD REVISITED
ANN POWERS*
I. INTRODUCTION
When the United States Department of Justice filed a Clean Water
Act' enforcement action in December 1996 against Smithfield Foods and
its two subsidiaries, Smithfield Packing and Gwaltney of Smithfield,2 it
was only the latest installment in an ongoing saga of the companies'
disregard of environmental obligations, the state's abdication of its role as
guardian of Virginia's natural resources, and efforts by citizens and the
federal government to enforce the law. While those elements alone would
provide sufficient local drama, the conflict has had an impact far beyond
the borders of Virginia. It evolved from a fight to protect the Chesapeake
Bay and its tributaries to a continuing national debate regarding the legal
rights of citizens to assist in enforcing a broad range of federal
environmental laws.
The key player in that evolution has been the Supreme Court,
which ruled in an earlier case involving Smithfield, Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, Inc. & Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gwaltney
of Smithfield, Ltd. (Gwaltney),3 that the Clean Water Act provided no
jurisdiction for citizens to seek penalties for past violations and, therefore
a citizen's right to enforce the statute was considerably more limited than
that of the federal government.' That decision, due both to what the Court
said and what it left unsaid, has created substantial impediments for
* Associate Professor of Law, Center for Environmental Studies, Pace University School
of Law. The author was Vice President and General Counsel of the Chesapeake Bay
Foundation when Gwaltney of Sinitlfield Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. &
Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987), was litigated at the various
judicial levels. The author wishes to thank those who gave her comments and
suggestions, including James Hecker, Donald Doemberg, Stuart Madden, and Jay
Carlisle.
'33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
2 United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., Smithfield Packing Company, Inc., & Gwaltney
of Smithfield, Ltd., 965 F. Supp. 769 (summary judgment), 969 F. Supp. 975 (motion for
reconsideration denied) (E.D. Va. 1997), appeal docketed, No. 97-2709 (4th Cir. Dec. 9,
1997). The government prosecution will be referred to as United States v. Smithfield.
' 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
4 See id. at 58-59.
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citizens attempting to protect their local water bodies.' Their ability to
enforce the Clean Water Act, as well as other environmental statutes,
contrasts sharply with the government's broad enforcement power,
reflected in cases such as United States v. Smithfield.
Moreover, Gwaltney gave an early indication of the restrictions
which would later be placed on citizen standing in environmental cases.
While standing was not a prominent issue in Gwaltney, Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion presages a fuller explication in later cases of his
Article III,6 and eventually Article II,7 based formulations which generally
restrict standing for environmentalists in citizen suit cases.8 The most
recent iteration of those concepts appeared in last term's opinion in Steel
Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment,9 where the Court ruled,
' See Beverly McQueary Smith, The Viability of Citizens' Suits Under the Clean Water
Act After Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 40 CASE W. REs. L.
REV. 1, 62 (1990) [hereinafter Smith, The Viability of Citizens'Suits].
6 U.S. CONST., art. III. Article III limits the judicial power vested in federal courts to
"Cases" and "Controversies." The requirement that there be a justiciable case or
controversy is the basis for the standing doctrine. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Karin P. Sheldon, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: The
Supreme Court's Slash and Burn Approach to Environmental Standing, 23 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,031, 10,032, 10,036-37 (1993). See also Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, rejected the
citizens' standing claims, but on statutory, rather than constitutional grounds); Karin
Sheldon, NWF v. Lujan: Justice Scalia Restricts Environmental Standing to Constrain
the Courts, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,557, 10,558 (1990).
' U.S. CONST., art. II. Article II vests the executive, legislative and judicial functions in
the three separate branches of government. Section 3 of the Article contains the so-called
"Take Care Clause" which directs that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed." In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992), the
Court relied upon this Clause to limit the ability of Congress to define injuries so as to
provide a generalized right of standing. See Standing-Congressional Power to Define
Judicially Cognizable Injuries, 106 HARV. L. REV. 308 (1992).
' By contrast, in Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997), the Court liberalized the
standing requirements somewhat by ruling that the "zone-of-interests test" established in
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations. Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970), was prudential, and not a requirement of Article III. Thus Congress might negate
the judge-made rule through specific legislative language. The Court found that the
citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (1994),
which allows "any person" to commence an action, had expanded standing under the Act
to the full extent permitted under Article III. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1163. See also
Bernard Schwartz, A Presidential Strikeout. Federalism, RFRA, Standing, and Stealth
Court, 33 TULSA L.J. 77, 84-87 (1997). The practical effect of this holding was to extend
standing to the regulated community to challenge environmental actions.
"118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998).
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Justice Scalia writing, that citizens have no standing to seek penalties
under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
(EPCRA)' ° for reporting violations that had been cured by the defendant
corporation." That decision, and the lower court cases following it, reflect
an increasingly restrictive judicial approach to citizen litigation that may
lead to an ever greater divergence between government and citizen
enforcement authority, which Congress originally intended to be
coextensive.
This article returns to the earlier Gwaltney decision, looking both
to the text of the Gwaltney opinion, and to internal memoranda
demonstrating the debate which occurred among the justices themselves
over the nature of the beast with which they were dealing: a confusing
mixture of subject matter jurisdiction, substantive cause of action and
constitutionally based standing requirements. This review leads to the
conclusion that the opinion's lack of analytical clarity, which created
substantial confusion for courts and litigants, could have been avoided by
a more carefully reasoned work based on the Court's internal discussions.
Further, the Court's decision in Steel Company demonstrates a debate
within the Court regarding the import of Gwaltney, raising questions as to
its future application, as well as the eventual fate of citizen suits under
federal environmental statutes.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS
While not the oldest, Clean Water Act (CWA) section 505 '2 is the
most prominent and the most litigated of the citizen suit provisions found
in our environmental statutes.'3 Enacted in 1972 and modeled after the
Clean Air Act (CAA),"' it allows citizens to bring suits against the
government for failure to carry out mandated duties,"- and against entities,
'0 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994). The citizen suit provision is found at 42 U.S.C. §
11046(a)(1).
" See Steel Company, 118 S. Ct. at 1020.
'2 Pub. L. 92-500, § 505, 86 Stat. 888, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994).
'" See LISA JORGENSON & JEFFREY J. KIMMEL, BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS,
ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS: CONFRONTING THE CORPORATIONS 19 (1988) (of over
1200 citizen actions reviewed, 882 were Clean Water Act claims); Randall S. Abate,
Rethinking Citizen Suits for Past Violations of Federal Laws: Recommendations for the
Next Decade of Applying the Gwaltney Standard, 16 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1
(1997).
" Pub. L. 91- 604, § 304, 84 Stat. 1706, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994).
'. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the
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both public and private, which violate provisions of the statute . 6
Authorizations for a citizen to bring suit are not unique to environmental
law, 7 and find their heritage in both American and English law of previous
centuries. 8  In enacting section 505, Congress understood that the
resources of the government were limited, and that citizens could therefore
supplement the government in its enforcement endeavors." It also
recognized that the government might not always have the will to
prosecute a violator, and citizen suits were useful to goad the executive
branch to action. 0 In examining the relevant legislative history, there is
scant support for the notion that Congress intended citizens to be more
constrained in the scope of their prosecutions than the government.',
However, two limitations protecting the primacy of governmental
enforcement were placed on a citizen's initiation of a lawsuit. First, a
potential litigant must give notice to the government and to the
constitution).
6 See id. (authorizing a citizen to initiate an action against "any person" alleged to be in
violation of federal or state limitations). A "person" under section 1362 is defined as "an
individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, or
political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body."
17 A number of statutes other that those dealing with environmental law contain
provisions which allow citizens to bring private actions to enforce the law or to recover
for injuries. See, e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994); Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77k (a) (1994); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (1994); Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(a), 2000e-5(b) (1994).
8 See Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A
Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L.
REV. 833, 946-57 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen
Suits, "Injuries," andArticle 111, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 171-79 (1992); Steven L. Winter,
The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371,
1394-1409 (1988). See also James M. Hecker, The Citizen's Role in Environmental
Enforcement: Private Attorney General, Private Citizen, or Both?, 8-SPG NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 31 (1994) (characterizing citizen suits as a blend of private and
public rights).
"' See S. REP. No. 414, at 5 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3672.
20 See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546,
560 (1986) (Court noted that congressional displeasure with "restrained" governmental
enforcement of Clean Air Act led to first citizen-suit provision); S. REP. No. 414, supra
note 19, at 5.
2 Not only the similarity of language between the government and citizen enforcement
provision, but also the legislative history suggests that Congress viewed citizens as
private attorneys general, who were "provided the right to seek vigorous enforcement
action under the citizen suit provisions of section 505." S. REP. No. 414, at 64 (1972),
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3730.
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prospective defendant of his intent to sue.22 The second limitation
generally prohibits suit if the federal or state government is already
pursuing enforcement actions?2 If, however, a citizen files his suit first,
the court generally will not be ousted of jurisdiction by a subsequent
government suit.2" These preconditions having been met, the statute vests
jurisdiction in the district court to enforce certain provisions of the law,25
and to apply civil penalties as spelled out in section 309,26 the general
enforcement provisions applicable to both government and citizen
prosecutors.
Within this framework a number of citizen suits were brought in
the 1970s. Most were filed against federal agencies to compel them to
carry out various mandatory duties, such as issuing standards. 7 It was not
22 See CWA § 505(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (1994). Although the Court in
Gwaltney declared that the intent of this provision was to give the violator an opportunity
to come into compliance, see 484 U.S. at 60, this view is simply unsupported by the
legislative history. Rather, the provision was to allow the government time to determine
whether to bring its own prosecution before allowing the citizen suit to proceed. See S.
REP. NO. 414, at 80 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3745-46; JEFFREY G.
MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL
LAWS § 6.1, 44-45 (1987) [hereinafter MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS]; Scott B. Garrison,
Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Standing, and Citizen Suits: The Effect of Gwaltney of
Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 48 MD. L. REV. 403, 419 & n.92 (1989);
Jeffrey M. Miller, Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.:
Invitation to the Dance of Litigation, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,098, 10,101-
02 (1988) [hereinafter Miller, Invitation]. Professor Miller also points out that the literal
language of the notice provision implies that suits for past violations were contemplated.
See id. Despite of the lack of support for Marshall's interpretation, it has become gospel,
and was most recently repeated by Justice Stevens in Steel Co. vs. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1031 (1998).
23 See CWA § 505(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B).
24 It is possible that a subsequently filed government lawsuit which is resolved prior to
the citizen suit may be determined to be resjudicata, barring further litigation by the
citizen plaintiff. See, e.g., EPA v. City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d 1394, 1404 (8th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 956 (1991). In any suit brought by a citizen, the
government may intervene as a matter of right. See CWA § 505(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. §
1365(c)(2).
2 Citizens may bring suit against "any person.., who is alleged to be in violation of (A)
an effluent standard or limitation ... or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a
State with respect to such a standard or limitation." CWA § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. §
1365(a)(1).
26 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).
2' See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir.
1976) (action seeking to force the Environmental Protection Agency to list lead as
hazardous air pollutant pursuant to Clean Air Act § 108); Natural Resources Defense
1999]
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until the early 1980s that citizens, impelled by discontent with
implementation and enforcement of environmental laws during the
administration of President Ronald Reagan, began to focus on litigation
directly against polluters. 8 The Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), a national public interest environmental organization, established
a Clean Water Act Enforcement Project aimed at identifying significant
violators which had not been brought to task by the government, and filing
suits to force compliance. NRDC joined forces with local and regional
environmental groups in this effort, including the Chesapeake Bay
Foundation (CBF), an organization focused on protecting and restoring the
Chesapeake Bay.29 The two groups reviewed state and federal records, and
pinpointed Gwaltney and its sister company, Smithfield Packing, as two of
the most egregious violators in the region. 0 After giving the requisite
notice, CBF and NRDC filed suit against Gwaltney in federal district
court.3 The state of Virginia subsequently brought an action in state court
against Gwaltney, which it dismissed after trial of the federal action.12
Council, Inc. v. Train, 519 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1975), on remand, 6 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,588 (D.D.C. 1976) (suit to force the Environmental Protection
Agency to promulgate effluent standards for toxics under Clean Water Act § 307); Boyer
& Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatoiy Enforcement, supra note 18, at 852-53.
28 See JEFFREY G. MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS, supra note 22, § 2.3; Boyer & Meidinger,
Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement, supra note 18, at 845-46, 852-53. See also S. REP.
No. 414, at 5 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3672 (noting almost total
lack of government enforcement under Clean Water Act); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO/RCED-84-53, WASTEWATER DISCHARGERS ARE NOT COMPLYING WITH
EPA POLLUTION CONTROL PERMITS (1983) (reporting a significant decline in federal
enforcement).
29 See JEFFREY G. MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS, supra note 22, § 2.3, 11 (1987); Smith, The
Viability of Citizens' Suits, supra note 5, at 43-44. See also Theodore L. Garrett, Citizen
Suits After Gwaltney, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, C266 ALI-
ABA 305, 308-09 (1988).
30 Two other major violators identified by the groups were American Recovery and
Bethlehem Steel, both in Baltimore, Maryland. See Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. &
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. American Recovery Co., 769 F.2d 207 (4th
Cir. 1985); Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. & Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620 (D. Md. 1987).
", Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 611 F.Supp. 1542, 1544 (E.D.
Va. 1985) [hereinafter Gwaltney I].
32 Commonwealth v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., No. 3371 (Cir. Ct. Isle of Wight Co.
filed July 10, 1984) (order of nonsuit Aug. 28, 1985). The Commonwealth had
previously filed a separate suit against Smithfield Packing Company, another subsidiary
of Smithfield Foods, which operated a facility near Gwaltney, alleging 152 violations of
its wastewater discharge permit. See Commonwealth v. Smithfield Packing Co., Inc, No.
562 [Vol. 23:557
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Gwaltney and Smithfield Packing are the subject of the government's
subsequent enforcement action.
III. THE GWALTNEY LITIGATION
Gwaltney of Smithfield was, and is, a major meatpacking
operation, slaughtering thousands of hogs a day.33 Its wastes are organic,
largely offal from the slaughtering operations.34 These wastes were treated
in a standard biological process, similar to that used by sewage treatment
plants, and discharged to the Pagan River, a tributary to the Chesapeake
Bay.3" The discharge was covered by a permit issued by the state of
Virginia under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System?6
Although a number of pollutants were controlled under the permit, the two
of primary interest were chlorine, a toxic used to disinfect wastes, and
nitrogen, a pollutant which contributes to algal growth and low levels of
dissolved oxygen, or hypoxia, in the Bay and its tributaries. 7 Plaintiffs
moved for summary judgment based on permit violations contained in
reports filed with the government,38 and District Judge Robert R. Merhige,
3290 (Cir. Ct. Isle of Wight Co. filed Oct. 24, 1983). The Chesapeake Bay Foundation
intervened in that suit. The court found Smithfield Packing liable and imposed a penalty
of $40,000. Opinion (Dec. 14, 1984).
31 See WELLS ENGINEERS ENVIRONMENTAL, INC., STUDY AND REPORT: PHOSPHORUS
REMOVAL; SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC.; SMITHFIELD, VIRGINIA, 1 (1990).
34 See id. at 2.
3 The violations which CBF and NRDC challenged were essentially similar to those in
the current government prosecution. See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F.
Supp. 769, 774 (E.D. Va. 1997).36 See CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994).
17 When algae die the decomposition process uses oxygen, lowering the level of
dissolved oxygen in the water column. Adequate levels of dissolved oxygen are essential
for aquatic life such as fish and shellfish. Hypoxia can be especially damaging for
organisms, such as oysters, which cannot move to more oxygen-enriched waters.
Hypoxia can also alter the ecological makeup of a water body, wiping out organisms
sensitive to low oxygen levels, while allowing those types of organisms which can
sustain themselves in such conditions to survive. See LONG ISLAND SOUND STUDY,
HYPOXIA AND NUTRIENT ENRICHMENT-ASSESSMENT OF CONDITIONS AND
MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (1993). In addition, algae cloud the water,
depriving submerged aquatic vegetation important to many species for food and habitat
of the light necessary for growth. See Alliance for the Chesapeake, New Air Rules
Expected to Help Reduce Bay Nutrients, BAY JOURNAL, July-Aug., 1997, at 10.
38 Discharge Monitoring Reports (DMRs) detailing the level of compliance achieved for
the effluents regulated by the permit must be filed at prescribed intervals and are key to
facility of oversight and enforcement. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(l)(4) (1998).
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Jr., granted the motion, finding Gwaltney liable for over 600 days of
violation of the chlorine and nitrogen limitations in its permit. 9 After a
trial on the remedy, the court imposed a penalty of $1.28 million;40 almost
$1 million was based on the chlorine violations, and the balance was a
result of the nitrogen discharges. 4' The court rejected a post-trial challenge
to its subject matter jurisdiction in which the defendant argued that the
language of section 505 permitted suits only when the discharger was
violating the Act at the time the complaint was filed.- Defendant's
argument was based on a Fifth Circuit decision issued after the Gwaltney
trial was concluded, Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co.,41 in
which a court had for the first time ruled in such a fashion. It was
generally viewed by public interest environmental attorneys as an
aberration, flying in the face of the obvious intent of Congress to allow
citizens to step into the shoes of the government when bringing suits under
section 505 and similar provisions." Judge Merhige concurred in this
assessment and ruled against defendants.4" On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the ruling, 6 creating a conflict with the Fifth Circuit and setting
the stage for the company's petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court.
Upon initial consideration of the petition only three of the Justices
voted to hear the case. 47  But subsequently the First Circuit reached a
conclusion different from both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits on the
jurisdictional issue in an action under Clean Water Act section 505. In
Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.," the First Circuit held
3" See Gwaltney I, 611 F.Supp. 1542, 1555 (E.D. Va. 1985).
4oSee id. at 1564. See Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791
F.2d 304, 307-08 (4th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Gwaltney II]. This was the largest penalty
ever imposed to date in a citizen suit; it exceeded most penalties obtained by the
government. See Smith, The Viability of Citizens Suits, supra note 5, at 44.
4" See Gwaltney 1, 611 F. Supp. at 1562, 1565.
42 See id. at 1544.
"' 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985).
14 At that time the enforcement powers of citizens were generally viewed as co-extensive
with those of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. See Gwaltney II, 791 F.2d at
310, and cases cited therein.
See Gwaltney 1, 611 F. Supp. at 1548.
46See Gwaltney II, 791 F.2d at 310-11.
4 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., No. 86-473, Bench
Memorandum, Oct. 5, 1987 (Aug. 27, 1987), Thurgood Marshall Papers (on file with the
Manuscript Division, U.S. Library of Congress) [hereinafter Marshall Papers], box 427,
folder 8.
48 807 F.2d 1089 (Ist Cir. 1986).
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that citizens could not bring suit for violations that were totally past, but a
plaintiff who in good faith made allegations of an ongoing violation could
enforce penalties for past violations even if no ongoing violations were
proven." Based on this decision, Justice White drafted a dissent to the
denial of the certiorari petition ° that induced Justice Powell to change his
negative vote, making the fourth requisite vote to grant the petition."
Thus, when the case was presented to the Supreme Court, three
Circuits had rendered three different opinions on whether section 505
conferred jurisdiction on the courts to impose penalties in a suit brought
by citizens when the violations had ceased before the complaint was filed.
The Fifth Circuit in Hamker had ruled that there was no jurisdiction to
enforce the penalty provisions in such a circumstance. 2  The Fourth
Circuit decided in Gwaltney that citizens could bring such a suit,53 while
the First Circuit had ruled that citizens could enforce penalties for past
violations so long as they had in good faith alleged an ongoing violation.54
All those involved in citizen suit litigation-public interest, industry and
the government attorneys-focused their attention on the Supreme Court's
consideration of Gwaltney.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. Divining Congressional Intent
The Gwaltney decision, written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, well
reflects the problems which plague litigants and the courts when Congress
4" See Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc., 807 F.2d at 1094.
0 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., No. 86-473, Second
Draft of Dissent from Denial of Certiorari by Justice Byron White (Jan. 8, 1987),
Marshall Papers, supra note 47, box 440, folder 4. Justice White had drafted an earlier
dissent from the denial, but reissued it adding the Pawtuxet Cove case. See First Draft of
Dissent from Denial of Certiorari by Justice Byron White (Dec. 22, 1986), Marshall
Papers, supra note 47, box 440, folder 4.
"' See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., No. 86-473, Bench
Memorandum, Oct. 5, 1987, at 1 (Aug. 27, 1987), Marshall Papers, suepra note 47, box
427, folder 8. Voting for certiorari were Justices White, Stevens, Scalia and Powell. See
id.
52 See Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., 756 F.2d 392, 394 (5th Cir. 1985).
. See Givaltney II, 791 F.2d 304, 308-09 (4th Cir. 1986).
" See Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089, 1094 (Ist Cir.
1986).
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writes laws with less than "syntactical precision."55 Laboring under the
assumption that Congress knew what it was doing, an effort must be made
to divine exactly what that body intended.
The statutory language central to the Gwaltney debate is found in
section 505(a)(1) which specifies that "any citizen may commence a civil
action... (1) against any person... who is alleged to be in violation of'
certain requirements of the law. 6 Jurisdiction is vested in the district
courts to enforce the provisions of the statute and to apply "any
appropriate civil penalties" under section 309(d), the general penalty
provisions of the Clean Water Act, which is applicable to both citizen and
government enforcement. 7 The "alleged to be in violation" formulation is
somewhat unusual as most statutes impose sanctions on those who
"violate," "are violating," " have violated" or are simply "in violation" of
the law. Much turned on the "alleged to be in violation" phrase, and
reading the briefs, the decision and subsequent analyses brings to mind
Humpty Dumpty's admonition to Alice, "When I use a word... it means
just what I choose it to mean. . . neither more nor less."58
Just what Congress chose these words to mean is not found in the
legislative history of the Clean Water Act, but the language obviously was
" Brief for the Respondents at 22, Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Found, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
56 CWA § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994) provides:
Citizen suits.
(a) Authorization; jurisdiction
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and section
1319(g)(6) of this title, any citizen may commence a civil action on his
own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted
by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in
violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or
(B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such
a standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is
not discretionary with the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an
effluent standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the
Administrator to perform such act or duty, as the case may be, and to
apply any appropriate civil penalties under section 1319(d) of this title.
57 See id.
58 LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS 198 (Messner ed. 1982).
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copied from the original citizen suit language in the Clean Air Act.59
Although the Clean Air Act legislative history is less than enlightening on
this point, the "alleged to be in violation" language made sense in that
context because, until amended in 1990, the Clean Air Act allowed citizen
suits only to abate an ongoing violation and not to enforce penalty
provisions." Accordingly, the language of the statute was drafted to
address a situation in which the violation was ongoing, and not one in
which past violations were a factor. The Clean Air Act language provided
an easy model for the drafters of the Clean Water Act, who simply adopted
it without modification.6 Indeed, there is no reason to believe that
Congress thought about this particular issue at all. It seems a classic case
of Congress drafting a law which appears to be straightforward-allowing
citizens to sue to enforce the law-but which has enough ambiguity to
permit creative lawyers to read into it meaning that favors their clients.
And unfortunately for citizens, that ambiguity was enough to create an
issue for certiorari.
Petitioner Gwaltney framed its challenge in terms of subject matter
jurisdiction, arguing that Congress intended the courts to be able to hear
only those cases in which the defendant was "in violation" at the time the
complaint was filed,62 and that a citizen's cause of action should be limited
to abating the violations and enforcing penalties for violations that
occurred at the time the complaint was filed or thereafter.63 CBF and
" CWA § 304(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (1994). See Miller, Invitation, supra note
22, at 10,100.60 See 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994).
61 See Miller, Invitation, supra note 22, at 10,100.
62 Gwaltney challenged plaintiffs' standing in district court in its answer to the complaint
and moved to dismiss. Answer at 2-4. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the
liability issue, and Judge Merhige granted summary judgment for plaintiffs on liability.
See Charles N. Nauen, Citizen Environmental Lawsuits After Gwaltney: The Thrill of
Victoiy or the Agony of Defeat? 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 327, 342 (1989) (citing
Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 108 S.Ct. 376, 380 (1987)).
Subsequently Gwaltney sought to force plaintiffs to present proof of standing at trial,
without success. See Givaltney 1, 611 F. Supp. 1542, 1545-47 & n.5 (E.D. Va. 1985).
Gwaltney did not appeal on the standing issue, See Givaltney 11, 791 F.2d 304, 306 n.1
(4th Cir. 1985), or directly challenge standing in the Supreme Court. See Gwaltney, 484
U.S. 49, 70 (1987). The company did raise standing in its reply brief, but only as it
related to redressability. See Reply brief for Petitioner 17-18, Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
63 See Lance L. Shea, Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation: Balancing
Interests Under the Clean Water Act, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857, 859 (1988) (citing
Givaltney 1, 611 F. Supp. at 1544).
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NRDC rejoined that a citizen's right to sue was coextensive with that of
the government, which is to say that a citizen might seek abatement as
well as penalties for both ongoing and past violations.
B. The Government's Position
An additional participant in the debate was the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) whose staff was generally sympathetic to citizen
enforcement efforts and had a strong interest in judicial construction of the
citizen suit provisions.' The Department of Justice filed an amicus brief
in the Fourth Circuit on behalf of CBF and NRDC, who ceded argument
time to the government." When the case reached the Supreme Court, the
Solicitor General filed a brief on behalf of the United States supporting
affirmance of the appellate ruling.6 But the position the Solicitor argued
was not the same as plaintiffs', and aligned more closely with the First
Circuit in Pawtuxet Cove Marina67 that a good faith allegation of present
noncompliance was the standard established by section 505.61 The
government's position was arrived at only after extensive discussion
between representatives of EPA and the Department of Justice, as well as
lawyers for plaintiffs and defendant, as both sides sought Justice
Department support for their positions.69 Although some officials within
the Justice Department were strongly disposed toward Gwaltney's
position, there was concern by others that a ruling limiting citizens to
penalties for past violations could lead to a similar limitation in
government enforcement cases.7' Because the "in violation" language is
also found in section 309, the general enforcement provisions apply to
both the government and citizens. 7' Thus the Solicitor chose a middle
' See, e.g., Smith, The Viability of Citizens'Suits, supra note 5, at 19.
65 See Letter from John M. Greacen, Clerk of the Court, Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v.
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304, 307-08 (4th Cir. 1986) (No. 85-1873), Jan.
21, 1986.
66 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 14-22,
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
67 807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir.1986).
6" See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 14-22,
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
69 The author was a participant in these discussions.
70 id.
7' See, e.g., CWA § 309(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (1994) (the Administrator is
authorized to take enforcement actions whenever he "finds that any person is il violation
of any condition or limitation") (emphasis added); § 309(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3)
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ground which supported plaintiffs, 72 but differentiated the scope of subject
matter jurisdiction conferred upon citizens from that of the government. 73
The decision issued by the Court rejected the positions of both the
citizen groups and the company, and essentially adopted the middle
ground staked out by the First Circuit in Pawtuxet Cove and the
government. Unfortunately, it did not do so in the same straightforward
manner found in the appellate court decisions in Gwaltney and Pawtuxet
Cove and in the brief filed by the Solicitor General. Admittedly, the
Court's analysis of section 505 was complicated by the unusual
confluence of subject matter jurisdiction, cause of action and standing,
which presented analytical problems, as reflected both in the opinion and
the internal memoranda circulated among the justices. But the opinion
ultimately did not present a clear and cogent analysis of the issues.
C. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, drafted by Justice Marshall, ignored the
textual similarity of the government and citizen suit provisions and the
(the Administrator may issue a compliance order when he "finds that any person is in
violation" of provisions of the statute) (emphasis added); CWA § 309(c), 33 U.S.C. §
1319(c) (criminal penalties may be imposed against "[a]ny person who willfully or
negligently violates" provisions of the statute or permit conditions or limitations)
(emphasis added); CWA § 309(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (civil penalties may be imposed
against "[a]ny person who violates" provisions of the statute or permit limitations or
conditions) (emphasis added). Thus, if a citizen were prohibited from taking any
enforcement action against polluters whose violations ceased prior to the filing of suit,
the same prohibition should logically apply to government enforcement.
72 Plaintiffs/respondents again ceded time to the government for oral argument, but were
pointed in remarking on the Solicitor's position: "Although grateful for this support, so
far as it goes, we surmise that conflicting interests within the Government have, once
again, led to an unrealistic search for a 'middle ground."' Brief for the Respondents at
26 n.19, Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49
(1987).
71 In Gwaltney, no mention is made of Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (establishing the standard by which a court reviews an
agency's interpretation of a statute which it administers). This is most likely because the
statutory provision at issue was not addressed administratively by the agency, but only in
its amicus brief. It is doubtful whether a position developed as a litigation strategy
should be afforded the same deference as one that has survived the administrative
process. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988).
Moreover, CWA § 505 deals with jurisdiction, a matter more suited to judicial rather
than executive interpretation.
" See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
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legislative history.15 It severely undercut citizen enforcement rights under
the Clean Water Act, circumscribing the situations in which citizens might
enforce the Act's penalty provisions.76 Moreover, the decision caused
substantial confusion as to exactly what was required of litigants, that
might have been avoided by clearer drafting.
In Justice Marshall's view, Congress intended a good-faith
allegation of an on-going violation to suffice for jurisdictional purposes."
Plaintiffs would be constrained by the requirement, set forth in Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of a good-faith belief well-grounded
in fact in order to file the complaint.78 Once suit had commenced, a
defendant might, under proper circumstances, avail itself of the mootness
doctrine in order to have the suit dismissed. Marshall noted that Supreme
'7 The Court also misread the overall purpose of citizen suits, focusing on the argument
that the provisions were aimed primarily at allowing citizens to abate violations, and not
to step fully into the shoes of the government. The Court characterized the citizen's role
at "supplemental" and "interstitial." See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60-61.
76 See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 65. Neither the Fourth Circuit nor the Supreme Court
questioned that the government could sue to collect penalties for past violations. See
Gwaltney 11, 791 F.2d at 309; Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 58. Accordingly, EPA has generally
not had to concern itself with whether violations it prosecuted were ongoing. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ohio Edison Co., 725 F. Supp.928, 931-32 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (rejecting
defendant's argument that it must have been in violation of Act when suit was filed).
However, in 3M v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1462 (D.C. Cir.1994), the court ruled that the
statute of limitations begins to run at the time a violation occurs, not when it is
discovered. But see United States v. Telluride Co., (10th Cir. 1998) (dealing with
retroactive injunctions as remedial measures for wholly past violations). Thus it is in
EPA's interest in some instances to argue that a violation is not a one time occurrence,
but ongoing and recurrent.
71 See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 65.
78 See id. One commentator suggested that the Supreme Court's approach differed
slightly from that of the First Circuit, which seemed to place more emphasis on
defendant's likelihood of continuing its violative conduct than on plaintiff's good faith
belief. See Scott B. Garrison, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Standing, and Citizen Suits:
The Effect of Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 48 MD. L.
REV. 403, 432 (1989). See also Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807
F.2d 1089, 1093-94 (1st Cir. 1986).
7
'
9 See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 66. Marshall's brief reference to mootness seemed intended
to do no more than point out that traditional notions of mootness would apply in citizen
suit cases, but its effect seemingly was to encourage defendants to raise mootness claims.
That was certainly the effect in Gwaltney, where defendants raised the issue for the first
time on remand. See Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 890 F.2d
690, 696 (4th Cir. 1989). The court refused to find the claim moot, and until recently
most courts have similarly found those claims unavailing. However, the Fourth Circuit
recently revised it position on the issue, ruling in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
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Court standing jurisprudence recognized that allegations of injury were
sufficient to invoke a court's jurisdiction and rejected petitioner's
contention "that failure to require proof of allegations under § 505 would
permit plaintiffs whose allegations of ongoing violation are reasonable but
untrue to maintain suit in federal court even thought they lack
constitutional standing.""
Having dealt with the jurisdictional language of the statute, Justice
Marshall turned to the standing issue, describing the process by which a
plaintiffs standing might be challenged.' It is at this point that the
analysis falters. That is not because the process for challenging standing
described by Justice Marshall is incorrect.2 But the context in which it is
applied in Gwaltney, where the facts necessary to prove jurisdiction and
the facts necessary to prove the claim [and perhaps standing] are identical,
engendered a disappointing lack of clarity, and left substantial uncertainty
as to the standards citizen litigants would need to meet.
D. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia's concurrence did not make matters more plain. He
took Marshall to task for creating "a regime that is not only
extraordinary," but to his knowledge "unique,"83 by creating subject matter
jurisdiction based on a good faith allegation." In Scalia's view, thejurisdictional issue was whether the petitioner was "in violation" at the
time the complaint was filed." But he recognized that the evidence
necessary to prove that the petitioner was "in violation" was essentially the
same evidence that would be needed to prove a good-faith allegation; that
is, "whether petitioner had taken remedial steps that had clearly achieved
Environmental Serv. (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303, 306 (4th Cir. 1998), that an action might
become moot on appeal because the defendant had ceased its illegal conduct. See
discussiom infra note 183 and accompanying text.
80 Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 65.
81 See id. at 65-66.
82 A defendant may move for summary judgment on the standing issue, in which case
plaintiff will have to show, generally by affidavits, that his allegations of standing are not
a sham. If the motion fails, defendant may then put plaintiff to his proof at trial on the
merits. Marshall emphasized that there was no constitutional requirement that, in order
to invoke the district court's jurisdiction, a plaintiff offer this proof as a threshold matter.
See id. at 66.
"I M. at 68.
84 See id.
85 See id. at 69.
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the effect of curing all past violations by the time suit was brought. 8 6
Indeed, he concedes that the two standards would produce substantially
the same results. 7 Unfortunately for the lucidity of the opinion, Scalia
does no more than Marshall to acknowledge and analyze the difficulties
inherent in a situation where the jurisdictional facts and the cause of action
overlap.
Justice Scalia raised the standing question, arguing that if the
defendant was not in violation when the suit was initiated, then there
would be no remediable injury.8" He emphasized that this was both a
constitutional requirement and a specific requirement spelled out in the
statute which defines a "citizen" who might bring suit.89 Scalia concluded
that "we have interpreted the statute to confer subject-matter jurisdiction
over a class of cases in which, by the terms of the statute itself, there
cannot possibly be standing to sue."" Like Marshall, Scalia failed to
address the almost complete overlap in the statute of jurisdiction, merits,
and standing. But his standing argument is important because it reflects
his concern with necessity for an injury that can be redressed by the court
to support standing, which would eventuate in the Steel Company opinion.
This lack of analytical clarity hampered litigants and the lower
courts when parsing the decision for guidance. And at least some of that
might have been avoided by a more careful crafting of the opinion. But a
review of the colloquy among the judges while the opinion was being
drafted reveals little attention to the matter2 It is interesting, if not
instructive, for the way in which the court chose to address or not address
the issues.
V. THE COURT'S INTERNAL DISCUSSIONS
Roughly a month after the case was argued, Justice Marshall
86 Id. at 69-70.
87 See id. at 70.
88 See id.
89 See id. at 70. To have citizen's standing, one must have "an interest which is or may
be adversely affected." See also 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1994).
90 Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 71.
o One Supreme Court observer has suggested that the Justices are far less concerned than
academics with the specific language of opinions, which may be the joint product of
several Justices and their clerks. See Richard J. Lazarus, Counting Votes and
Discounting Holdings hI The Supreme Court's Takings Cases, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1099, 1119 (1998)
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circulated a draft opinion that, with minor changes, became the final
opinion of the Court.92 Both Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens voiced
concerns about language in the draft that indicated that citizens "may seek
civil penalties for past violations of the Act only in a suit brought to enjoin
or otherwise abate an ongoing violation."93 Scalia wrote to Marshall, "I
thought we had agreed to leave for another day the question whether, if
one continuing violation is established, penalties may be assessed with
respect to other violations that are not continuing."9 Stevens also wrote
that it was not necessary to decide the point in the case before them. He
further suggested that it was not necessary to decide whether the allegation
of ongoing violation was sufficient to confer jurisdiction: "[W]hy not
simply remand to the district court with instructions to make appropriate
findings concerning the adequacy of this proof and leave to another day
the more esoteric question whether the allegation by itself is enough to
support jurisdiction?" 6 Stevens continued:
"[i]f the plaintiff is unable to support an allegation of
continuous or intermittent violation by evidence that is
persuasive to the trial judge, the plaintiffs claim should
92 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., No. 86-473, First
Draft of Opinion for the Court, slip op. (Nov. 5, 1987), Marshall Papers, supra note 47,
box 440, folder 4.
Id. slip op. at 8.
4 Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Nov. 9,
1987), Marshall Papers, supra note 47. Subsequent to Gwaltney this issue has been
resolved in at least three different fashions by the lower courts. See, e.g., Chesapeake
Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 890 F.2d 690, 697-98 (4th Cir. 1989)
(ongoing violation of one parameter of the permit does not confer jurisdiction at to other
parameters); Friends of the Earth v. Chevron Chemical Co., 900 F.Supp. 67 (E.D. Tex.
1995) (accord); Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Elf Atochem N. America, Inc.,
817 F. Supp. 1164, 1176 (D.N.J. 1993) (good faith allegations of ongoing violation as to
one parameter establish jurisdiction over past and present violations); Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc., 2 F.3d 493, 503 (3d Cir. 1993)
(modified parameter-by-parameter approach in which ongoing violation of one parameter
establishes jurisdiction for violations of all parameters caused by the same technical
problem).
9S See Memorandum from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Nov.
9, 1987), Marshall Papers, supra note 47. Stevens wrote, "It is clear that a citizen may
recover civil penalties for violations of the Act that occur after the complaint is filed, but
I am not at all sure that such a recovery for 'past violations'-i.e., those that occurred
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fail. I am not sure it's a matter of critical importance
whether it fails for want of jurisdiction or simply fails for
want of proof.97
It was this latter point, whether a good faith allegation suffices for
jurisdiction under section 505, which was the focus of Scalia's first draft
of a concurrence. Scalia wrote to Marshall that he thought "it more
orthodox to achieve substantially the same result through interpretation of
the term 'in violation.""' Scalia's draft provides the only real discussion
of the factual overlap of jurisdiction and merits, and it is limited. There he
noted that some of the same facts would be involved in a challenge to the
jurisdictional allegation as well as on the merits, but called it "entirely
standard."'" "It is so commonplace for jurisdictional issues to overlap
with the merits that the Court's interpretation here can hardly be justified
on some principle that overlap is to be avoided wherever feasible.''
Scalia eliminated this language from the final version of the concurrence.
Scalia also wrote Marshall that language in Marshall's draft
opinion suggested that the plaintiff did not have to offer proof of his
allegations of standing if challenged by a motion for summary judgment.'0 2
That would conflict have conflicted with the Court's recent opinion in
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,103 in which the justices had ruled that summary
judgment must be granted against a plaintiff who does not make a showing
sufficient to establish the essential elements of his case.,' 4 In Scalia's
view, Celotex, as applied to a factual issue with respect to standing, would
97 id.
98 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., No. 86-473, First
Draft of Concurring Opinion by Justice Scalia (Nov. 9, 1987), slip op. at 2, Marshall
Papers, supra note 47.
99 Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Nov. 9,
1987), Marshall Papers, supra note 47.
"' Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., No. 86-473, First Draft
of Concurring Opinion by Justice Scalia (Nov. 9, 1987), slip op. at 2, Marshall Papers,
supra note 47. As an example, he stated that allegations of injury in fact made to support
standing could be challenged by a motion for summary judgment, and if genuine issues
of material fact remained, they might be litigated at trial, even in a situation where proof
of injury was part of plaintiff's case on the merits. See id.
I d.. slip op. at 3, Marshall Papers, supra note 47.
10_ See Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice Thurgood Marshall, (Nov.
10, 1987), Marshall Papers, supra note 47.
"03 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986).
104 See id. at 2552.
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require the plaintiff to respond to a motion for summary judgment with
sufficient evidence so that the court might rule in his favor.0 5 That burden
of production having been met, the motion should be denied and the issue
set for trial. ,o
In response to Stevens and Scalia, Marshall agreed that this case
was not the vehicle to decide "the difficult question of when civil penalties
are appropriate in conjunction with an action for abatement," and changed
the language that was of concern to Stevens and Scalia."7 As for Celotex,
Marshall assured Scalia that there was nothing inconsistent in the
Gwaltney opinion.' °8 The party moving for summary judgment bears the
burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact, he
said, and Gwaltney "in no way suggests that the nonmoving party may
prevail upon a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element
of that party's case."'' 9 But Marshall remained firm that the Court should
address the good-faith allegation question, noting that the parties and
amici all devoted substantial time to it below, and "[o]n remand, it will
certainly resurface, and our failure to address it here will only create
confusion and speculation." '0
1o5 See Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice Thurgood Marshall, (Nov.
10, 1987), Marshall Papers, supra note 47.
" See id.
... Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to the Conference, (Nov. 10, 1987),
Marshall Papers, supra note 47. The exchange among the justices gives no indication of
the latter linkage that some courts would make between penalties and injunctive relief.
See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Serv. (TOC), Inc., 149
F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998) cert. granted 119 S.Ct. 1111 (1999). See also discussion infra
note 183.
108 See Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to the Conference, (Nov. 10,
1987), Marshall Papers, supra note 47.
"o Id. Marshall later made a slight change in the opinion to make this point clear.
Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to Antonin Scalia, (Nov. 12, 1987),
Marshall Papers, supra note 47.
"o Id. The District Court had rendered an alternative holding based on respondents' good
faith allegation. See Givaltney 1, 611 F. Supp. 1542, 1549 n.8 (E.D. Va. 1985). The
Court of Appeals noted that a "sound argument" could be made in support of such a
holding, although it did not rule on the question. See Givaltney 11, 791 F.2d 304, 308 n.9
(4th Cir. 1986).
Justice O'Connor shared Stevens' and Scalia's concerns about the jurisdictional
issue and about the problem of recovery for past violations joined with an ongoing
violation, and said she would wait to see what changes were made in the draft. See
Memorandum from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Nov. 9,
1987), Marshall Papers, supra note 47. She eventually joined in the judgment and in
Scalia's concurrence.
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. The internal colloquy among Marshall, Stevens and Scalia
delineates fairly clearly the views of the justices, which is not necessarily
true of the language of the draft or the final majority and concurring
opinions. Marshall wrote to his colleagues that he saw Justice Stevens'
point that the ultimate outcome of this case "will not be affected whether
we require a good faith allegation of an ongoing violation or proof of that
allegation to support jurisdiction, because the allegation must ultimately
be proved or the case will fail on the merits.""
Marshall nevertheless was unmoved by Steven's request to avoid
addressing the issue, asserting that he continued
to believe (along with the Solicitor General) that Congress
used the word "alleged" in § 505 with a purpose. That
word does not frequently appear in grants of subject matter
jurisdiction. Congress more often requires that certain
events exist-for example, that citizens be residents of
different states or that the amount in controversy exceed
$10,000.112
Justice Marshall remained "convinced that this difference makes a
difference." "I
As for the points raised by Justice Scalia, Justice Marshall argued
that the express language of section 505 reflected "a perfectly logical and
reasonable congressional intent ... to permit the federal courts to assert
jurisdiction over such suits on the basis of good faith allegations and to
defer challenges to the underlying facts until summary judgment or
trial.""' Congress, he reasoned, recognized that proof of an ongoing
violation might be difficult, requiring substantial discovery, and that it
would overlap completely with proof on the merits at trial."' Yet in the
opinion for the Court, Marshall only obliquely refers to these
considerations, noting a congressional "sensitivity to the practical
difficulties of detecting and proving chronic episodic violations of
environmental standards.""'
". Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to the Conference, (Nov. 10, 1987),





"' Gwaltney, 484 U.S. 49, 65 (1987) (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at
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Continuing to outline the litigation process under his construction
of the statute, Marshall wrote to his colleagues, "I quite agree with Nino
that the truth of a plaintiffs allegations may be challenged, either in a
summary judgment motion or on the merits at trial." 7 He further agreed
that plaintiffs case would fail at summary judgment without a genuine
issue of material fact as to the truth of the allegations, and, as Justice
Stevens had noted, there would be "no way for a plaintiff to prevail on the
merits without ultimately proving the truth of his allegations."" 8 Again,
this recognition of the need to prove at some point the allegations of
ongoing violation did not appear clearly in the opinion."9
Marshall professed himself puzzled by the tone of Scalia's draft
concurrence, complaining that their disagreement was a "semantic
squabble,.-"What I would term dismissal for lack of standing or failure
of proof on the merits, Nino would call a defect in subject matter
jurisdiction,"--and had no practical consequences. 20 He did not believe
that any Clean Water Act cases would come out differently because of his
construction, and affirmed that his opinion only interpreted the
jurisdictional grant contained in unusual language of section 505 of the
Clean Water Act, and that it was not a pronouncement of any generally
applicable principles ofjurisdiction."I
Scalia responded to Marshall, pursuing the good faith allegation
issue.22 He agreed that it was unlikely that Marshall's formulation would
make any difference in Clean Water Act cases.'23 But that only made him
"all the more reluctant to acknowledge that Congress has so subtly created
such an unusual jurisdictional provision-which will become known as
'Gwaltney-type jurisdiction,' and may be discovered in other statutes
18). The Solicitor General was of the same view, arguing that "[t]he statutory scheme
wisely postpones the question whether the defendant is in fact failing to comply with his
permit requirements for adjudication on the merits." Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 19.
,I' Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to the Conference, (Nov. 10, 1987),
Marshall Papers, supra note 47.
Id.
"9 The only reference to such a scheme was not related to the jurisdictional issue itself,
but appeared in Marshall's discussion of standing. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 65-66.
,20 Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to the Conference, (Nov. 10, 1987),
Marshall Papers, supra note 47.
121 See id.
'22 See Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice Thurgood Marshall, (Nov.
10, 1987), Marshall Papers, supra note 47.
123 See id.
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where it will make a difference."'24 He argued that for the benefit of both
the Court and Congress it seemed "an important part of sound judicial
practice not to discern such an irregular disposition where it has not been
clearly created."'12 5
Marshall remained unpersuaded, viewing as unfounded Scalia's
concern that this jurisdictional ruling would impact upon other statutes. 26
He replied, "Our reading of § 505 is expressly based upon Congress' use
of the word 'alleged' in the jurisdictional grant and the peculiar fact that
the proof of a plaintiffs allegations would overlap completely with the
merits of the case. '2  In his view, the "alleged to be in violation"
language was unlikely to appear often in statutory grants of authority, "and
on the rare occasions that it does occur, 'Gwaltney-type jurisdiction' is
probably warranted.' 28
Their differences remained unresolved, and with only the small
changes agreed to by Justice Marshall, his original draft became the
opinion of the Court. 29
VI. SPREADING CONFUSION
It is unfortunate that the final versions of both Justice Marshall's
majority opinion and Justice Scalia's concurrence left considerable
uncertainty as to the standard being applied and the timing of proof. The
quizzical titles of articles written at the time are ample illustration of the
confusion that prevailed. 3 On remand, the Fourth Circuit reflected that
124 id.
125 id.
126 See Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to Justice Antonin Scalia, (Nov.
12, 1987), Marshall Papers, supra note 47.
127 Id.
128 Id.
'- Marshall obtained the votes of Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices Brennan,
White and Blackmun for his interpretation of § 505 jurisdiction, while Justices Stevens
and O'Connor joined Scalia's concurrence.
30 See Emily O'Connor, Comment, Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation-The End of the Inquhy or the Beginning of Confusion?, 50 U. PITT. L. REV.
1209 (1989); Joel A. Waite, The Continuing Questions Regarding Citizen Suits Under the
Clean Water Act: Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 46
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 313 (1989); Nauen, supra note 32. Mr. Nauen observed that both
industry and environmentalists proclaimed victory in the case, and suggested that either
side could be right, depending upon the manner in which lower courts interpreted the
decision. See id. at 349.
There were numerous commentators who pointed out issues, in addition to the
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uncertainty when the court reviewed and upheld the district court's finding
that CBF and NRDC had made a good faith allegation of ongoing
violations."' The appellate judges believed though that they were also
required by the Supreme Court's majority opinion to determine whether
plaintiffs had actually "proved their allegation of continuous or
intermittent violation, as required in order to prevail."'' 2 They took issue
with Justice Scalia's suggestion that the plaintiffs might never be called on
to prove the jurisdictional allegation, concluding that the "majority does
expressly require that a citizen-plaintiff prove the existence of an ongoing
violation (continuous or intermittent) in order to prevail."'33 The appellate
court believed that the difference between the majority and the concurring
justices was not whether an ongoing violation had to be proved, but when,
"with the concurrence requiring proof of an ongoing violation as a
threshold jurisdictional matter.""'3  Other courts have reached differing
question of when an ongoing violation must be proved, that were created or left
unresolved by Gwaltney: What constitutes good faith? How is an ongoing violation
defined? What is continuing or intermittent? Will it be analyzed in terms of aggregate
violations, or on a pollutant by pollutant basis? How is the mootness doctrine to be
applied? May penalties be assessed for precomplaint violations, or when abatement is
not appropriate? And what is the impact of cessation of violations under Article III?
See, e.g., Miller, Invitation, supra note 22, at 10,103-04; O'Connor, supra, at 1225-27;
Shea, supra note 63, at 871-878; L. Ward Wagstaff, Citizen Suits and the Clean Water
Act: The Supreme Court Decision in Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 891, 920-24; Waite, supra note 130.
' See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 844 F.2d 170
(1988).
'
3 2 Id. at 171.
'3' Id. at 171 n.1.
4 Id. The Fourth Circuit went further and outlined two alternatives by which the trial
court might determine whether an ongoing violation had been proved. Plaintiffs might
actually prove violations that continued on or after the date the complaint was filed, or
they might adduce evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that
there existed a "continuing likelihood of a recurrence in intermittent or sporadic
violations." Id. at 172. It has been suggested that the second alternative stretches the
definition of continuing violation found in the majority opinion. See O'Connor, supra
note 130, at 1227 (1989).
On remand to the district court, Judge Mehrige appeared to combine the
alternatives, finding that plaintiffs proved an ongoing violation since evidence adduced at
trial demonstrated a continuing likelihood that violations would recur, and reinstated the
full $1.3 million penalty. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found.,
Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1078, 1080 (E.D. Va. 1988). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the finding
of an ongoing violation, but ruled that penalties could not be imposed for certain
violations that had been wholly cured, and reduced the penalty to reflect that ruling. See
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 890 F.2d 690 (1989).
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conclusions when faced with the issue,'35 and it has not again been directly
addressed by the Supreme Court. In reviewing the course of citizen suit
litigation since Gwaltney, one author recently noted that the decision
engendered widespread chaos among the courts, and ten years after the
decision federal courts still struggle to ascertain the scope and
applicability of the standard it established.'3 6 The cost of such confusion in
terms of both judicial resources and litigants time and expenditures is
135 See, e.g., Carr v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055, 1061 (5th Cir. 1991)
(holding that subject matter jurisdiction and standing are threshold matters and may be
established by good faith allegation); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Texaco
Refining & Mktg., Inc., 2 F.3d 493, 501 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that proof of ongoing
violation required at trial to establish standing). For a recent example of both the
continuing confusion concerning the ongoing violation issue, as well as a graphic
example of the litigation problems with which a plaintiff must cope, see Atlantic States
Legal Found., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814 (7th Cir. 1997).
136 See Randall S. Abate, Rethinking Citizen Suits for Past Violations of Federal
Environmental Laws: Recommendations for the Next Decade of Applying the Gwaltney
Standard, 16 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1, 9-12 (1997). See also WILLIAM H.
RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 277-78, 289-90 (2d ed. 1994). It has led to
"procedural gamesmanship" on the part of defense counsel, who often file a motion to
dismiss in order to force citizen litigants to put on their case on the merits without
adequate time for preparation. See Robert Wiygul, Gwaltney Eight Years Later:
Proving Jurisdiction and Article III Standing in Clean Water Act Citizen Suits, 8 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 435, 442 (1995).
Some authors suggest that the decision has not substantially deterred citizens
from bringing meritorious suits. See, e.g., Wiygul, supra, at 454-55. There is some
support for this view, since a recent study found that citizen suits now account for almost
five times as many environmental prosecutions as do federal government suits. See David
R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System: Can
Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United States, the
States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1609, 1573 (1995). That raises the
question, however, whether government enforcement programs are sufficiently
addressing the problems of noncompliance.
The lower courts have to some extent mitigated the damaging impact of
Gwaltney through broad interpretations of the continuing violations doctrine. See Albert
C. Lin, Application of the Continuing Violations Doctrine to Environmental Law, 23
ECOLOGY L.Q. 723, 764-68 (1996). Nevertheless, one attorney who frequently
represents environmental citizen litigants estimates that Gwaltney bars 75-80% of suits
that could be meritorious. See Letter from James M. Hecker, Trial Lawyers for Public
Justice, to Ann Powers (Oct. 28, 1998) (on file with author). Moreover, recent Supreme
Court case law, and lower court decisions following it, threaten to make all civil penalty
claims moot in all citizen suits. See id. See also, Jim Hecker, EPCRA Citizen Suits After
Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 28 Envtl. L. Rep (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,306,
10,308-10 (1998); discussion infra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
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substantial. 37
What might the Court have done to alleviate the confusion? It
might have begun by emphasizing the unusual situation that pertained,
since the facts that might support jurisdiction, standing and the merits
were intertwined. But in order to determine how the Court might further
have explained its decision, we need to first examine the procedural
framework applicable to the case. That begins with the enabling statute.
VII. THE PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK
Typically, a statute creates a cause of action, and vests subject
matter jurisdiction in the court to hear claims based on that cause of
action. '38 Standing is an element of a court's jurisdiction, and the litigant
must meet any standing requirements spelled out in the statute or imposed
by the Constitution.'39 In the case of the Clean Water Act, section 505
creates the cause of action and provides the grant of jurisdiction.'4 0
Once a suit is filed, the defendant may move to dismiss a
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, including standing, under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).14' In reviewing a motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the court may go beyond the pleadings to
determine whether there is a reasonable basis for the jurisdictional claim,
but that inquiry is limited.'42 If the defendant believes that the pleading
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, then the motion lies
under Rulel2(b)(6)'43 and may be converted to a motion for summary
' Professor Rodgers estimated that it easily adds $1 million a year to the cost of citizen
suit litigation. RODGERS, supra note 136, at 290 & n.32. Some of the chaos and expense
might well have been lessened if the majority opinion in Gwaltnev had been clearer in its
explication of the burdens it placed on citizen litigants.
138 In some cases two different statutes may be implicated, one which confers the right, or
from which the right is implied, and another which grants the court authority to hear the
claim. The federal statutes providing federal question and diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction are the latter type. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1994).
3 ' See KENT SINCLAIR, SINCLAIR ON FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE, 63-65 (3d ed. 1997).
140 See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994).
' A motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) can be used to attack two types of defects: 1)
allegations which are insufficient to show jurisdiction: or 2) the court's actual lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. See 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1356 (1984).
142 See 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1350 (2d ed. 1990); 2 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 12.30[3] (3d ed. 1997).
143 In contrast to a motion under rule 12(b)(1). under 12(b)(6) the court makes no inquiry
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judgment under Rule 56 if matters extraneous to the pleadings are
submitted and considered. ' " But even at the summary judgment stage, the
court's inquiry as to jurisdiction is a restricted one. According to
Professor Wright:
[i]f, as will usually be true, the issue of jurisdictional
amount is closely tied to the merits of the cause, the court,
it is said, should be reluctant to insist on evidence with
respect thereto, lest, under the guise of determining
jurisdiction, the merits of the controversy between the
parties be summarily decided without the ordinary incidents
of trial. '45
If the motion fails, jurisdiction lies, and the matter is tried on the merits.
We must bear in mind that in most cases, jurisdictional facts, such
as amount in controversy, are required to establish jurisdiction but are not
elements of a plaintiffs case on the merits. 4 6 If the plaintiff proves less
than the jurisdictional amount, jurisdiction is not affected and recovery is
had for the amount proved.'47 Professor Wright explained why the amount
in controversy cannot be made dependent upon the amount the plaintiff
ultimately recovers:
To do so would make jurisdiction turn on a guess by the
trial court as to the final outcome, or would require a
preliminary trial on jurisdiction that would duplicate the
regular trial on the merits, or would demand a wasteful
jurisdictional dismissal, after the case has been fully heard
on the merits, because the final award was less than the
past the pleadings, and must assume for purposes of the motion that all of the allegations
in the complaint are true. See 2 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 12.34[I][b], [2] (3d ed. 1997).
'"FED R Civ P. 12(b)(6).
'4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 183 (1983).
,46 See id. at 182-83.
'4' The First Circuit in Pawtuxet Cove analyzed CWA § 505 in this fashion, giving the
"alleged to be in violation" language "the [full] practical construction that is given to the
$10,000 requirement for jurisdiction in a diversity case. There jurisdiction is not
necessarily lost if, in the final analysis, a lesser sum is involved, a reasonably held
allegation is sufficient." Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc., v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d
1089, 1093 (1st Cir. 1986) (citing St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303
U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938)).
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jurisdictional amount. '
Some of the confusion in the Gwaltney opinion may be due to the
fact that Justice Marshall did not carefully apply these rules to the
particular facts in Gwaltney. As Justice Scalia pointed out, the
jurisdictional fact under section 505 is a good faith allegation of an
ongoing violation.'49 That is akin to an allegation of a jurisdictional
amount. Thus the issue on a motion to dismiss should be whether
plaintiffs alleged ongoing violations;' on summary judgment it should be
whether plaintiffs in good faith believed the violations to be ongoing, or
perhaps whether they could reasonably have had such a belief An inquiry
into the existence of good faith would focus primarily on plaintiffs'
subjective beliefs. However, some examination of defendant's state of
compliance would probably be needed to establish the facts known to the
plaintiffs which reasonably could have led them to believe in good faith
that violations were ongoing. But plaintiffs would not have to show that
the company was actually in a state of noncompliance, only that they in
good faith believed that it was. The defendant could attempt to disprove
plaintiffs' good faith by establishing facts that were, or should have been,
known to plaintiffs at the time the complaint was filed demonstrating that
the violations had been fully rectified, and that no reasonable person could
have had a good faith belief of an ongoing violation.
In addition to challenging the court's subject matter jurisdiction
over the claim under section 505, the defendant may also challenge
plaintiffs' standing, again by demonstrating on a motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment "that the allegations were sham and raised no genuine
148 See WRIGHT, supra note 145, at 182. Diversity presents a slightly clearer situation
since the question of citizenship is not linked to the question of remedy. Thus if a good
faith allegation of diversity is made, and sustained on a motion to dismiss, then diversity
exists. It will not be defeated if one of the litigants later assumes residence in the
opponent's state. See id. at 156-57.
' ' See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. 49, 67-68 (1987).
".0 The Solicitor General provided a further analysis which the court might usefully have
employed:
If the citizen fails to allege a present violation, his complaint is subject
to dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted .... Furthermore, a citizen's failure to
allege a present violation also constitutes a jurisdictional defect that
would justify dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 20 n.32, 484 U.S.
49 (1987).
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issue of fact."'' The lack of standing could be because the plaintiffs did
not meet the standard for organizational standing, or because no injury
occurred to their members.'52
Having created this "peculiar" form of subject matter jurisdiction
in which the good faith allegation is the jurisdictional fact, cabined by
Rule 11 (and eventually the mootness doctrine), which would have
provided citizen litigants with a reasonably simple pleading hurdle,
Marshall reintroduced proof problems in his discussion of standing., 3
There again, the discussion is less enlightening than we might have hoped
for. The familiar litany is recited, that an allegation of the facts upon
which standing is based may be challenged by a motion for summary
judgment, and at trial on the merits "the plaintiff must prove the
allegations in order to prevail."' '  But the Court does not make it clear
what allegations it is referencing. Since the discussion concerns standing,
does it mean the allegation that there is an ongoing violation? If so, then
Marshall would require plaintiffs to prove a fact to sustain standing that is
not required to sustain jurisdiction. That being the case, plaintiffs would
be put to their proof on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment to
sustain standing, even if a good faith allegation was sufficient for
jurisdiction. The matter is no clearer today than it was eleven years ago,
as reflected by the Supreme Court's most recent citizen suit ruling.
VIII. GWALTNEYREDUX: STEEL COMPANY V. CITIZENS FOR A BETTER
ENVIRONMENT
The question of subject matter jurisdiction again came to the fore
in Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, '" which dealt with
the citizen suit provision of the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA). 56  Justice Scalia believed that plaintiffs
'' Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 66 (quoting U.S. v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 (1973)).
2 The bench memorandum regarding Gi'altney in Justice Marshall's files focused on
interpreting the jurisdictional scope of § 505, but did not deal with procedural issues,
perhaps because the memorandum suggested affirmance, concluding that "[t]he structure,
legislative history, and general purpose of the Clean Water Act support rspts'
interpretation of § 505 permitting citizen suits for purely past violations of the Act."
Bench Memorandum, Oct. 5, 1987 (Aug. 27, 1987), Marshall Papers, supra note 47, box
427, folder 8.
' ' See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 65.
114 Id. at 66.
'' 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998).
56 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (1994).
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standing had to be addressed as a threshold matter, while Justice Stevens
sought first to determine whether the statute conferred subject matter
jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim, and thus perhaps avoid the
constitutional standing issue.'
EPCRA's citizen suit provision, section 11046(a), "Authority to
Bring Civil Actions," allows a citizen to sue the government or private
parties who fail to do certain enumerated acts.'58 A separate section
contains the grant of jurisdiction. 9 Even though the statute does not
contain the "alleged to be in violation" language of the Clean Water Act,
Justice Stevens argued that the EPCRA provision was essentially similar
to that provision reviewed in Gwaltney, and therefore it did not grant
subject matter jurisdiction unless there was an ongoing violation. 60 Since
this was a jurisdictional issue, on a par with standing but with a statutory
rather than constitutional foundation, Stevens believed that it should have
been addressed first, and the constitutional standing issue thereby
avoided. 61 Justice Stevens contended that the statutory issue could also be
framed as whether the complaint stated a "cause of action," and that under
the Court's precedent'62 the existence of a cause of action could be
addressed, even if standing was uncertain. 63
Stevens went on to rely on Gwaltney to demonstrate that the
statutory question could be addressed first, regardless of whether it was
characterized as subject matter "jurisdiction" or "cause of action."'61
Stating that Gwaltney "powerfully demonstrates this point," Stevens
argued that while the Court there
framed the question as one of "jurisdiction,"... it could
also be said that the case presented the question whether the
plaintiffs had a "cause of action." Regardless of the label,
the Court resolved the statutory question without pausing to
'S See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1011.
.58 See 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a).
' The relevant provision is: "The district court shall have jurisdiction in actions brought
under subsection (a) of this section against an owner or operator of a facility to enforce
the requirement concerned and to impose any civil penalty provided for violation of that
requirement." Id. § 11046(c). The district court may grant only injunctive relief against
the government. See id.
160 See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1022.
"6' See id. at 1021.
162 See Bell v. Hood. 327 U.S. 678, 681-685 (1946).
'6
3 See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1024.
"I" Id. at 1025.
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consider whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue for
wholly past violations. Of course, the fact that we did not
discuss standing in Gwaltney does not establish that the
plaintiffs had standing there. Nonetheless, it supports the
proposition that-regardless of how the issue is
characterized-the Court has the power to address the
virtually identical statutory question in this case as well.' 65
The majority opinion in Steel Company in several instances takes on a
personal tone, with Scalia accusing Stevens of having once understood
"the fundamental distinction between arguing no cause of action and
arguing no Article III redressability,"' 66 and Stevens responding that it was
not his understanding that had changed, but the state of the Court's
standing doctrine due to the "current fascination with 'redressability.' ' 67
While there are legitimate questions as to whether Justice Stevens'
view of EPCRA's citizen suit provision is sound, his interpretation of the
Gwaltney decision seems more compatible with the text of the opinion and
with the discussion reflected in the internal memoranda than does Scalia's.
Faced with the fact that the Court in Gwaltney spoke extensively of
subject matter jurisdiction, Scalia strives to distinguish it by claiming that
"[]urisdiction... is a word of many, too many, meanings,"' 68 and finding
that the language of Clean Water Act section 505 differs from that of
EPCRA section 11046 sufficiently to make it unlikely that Congress
intended to make an ongoing violation a jurisdictional prerequisite.,, 9
Calling Gwaltney a "drive-by" jurisdictional ruling, Scalia goes further in
suggesting that the majority's opinion on this issue may not be a ruling at
,65 Id. Not only did Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia disagree on how to interpret
Gwaltney, they seemed to disagree on what was actually in the opinion, with Stevens
writing that standing was not discussed in Gwaltney, and Scalia asserting that standing
was found. See id. at 1011, 1025. In fact, as Stevens explains in a note, standing was
addressed, but only in relation to the principal holding. See id. at 1025 n.13. Plaintiffs'
standing was not specifically examined, it was perhaps implicitly decided.
'66 Id. at 1013.
167 Id. at 1024 n.9.
168 Id. at 1010 (quoting U.S. v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). We are
again reminded of Humpty Dumpty and poor Alice. See supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
' See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1010. Scalia seems to question whether CWA § 505 did
indeed address subject matter jurisdiction, noting that a particular phrase of § 505
"strongly suggested (perhaps misleadingly) that the provision was addressing genuine
subject-matter jurisdiction." Id.
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all, but mere dictum with no precedential effect. 7 In support of this view,
Scalia contends that the opinion displayed not "the slightest awareness that
anything turned upon whether the existence of a cause of action for past
violations was technically jurisdictional-as indeed nothing of substance
did."''M He declaims, "[t]he short of the matter is that the jurisdictional
character of the elements of the cause of action in Gwaltney made no
substantive difference (nor even any procedural difference that the Court
seemed aware of), had been assumed by the parties, and was assumed
without discussion by the Court."17
In his eagerness to distinguish Gwaltney, Scalia ignores the fact
that from the time defendant filed its motion to dismiss based on Hamker,
Gwaltney was about subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant pled in that
manner,' the district court ruled on the issue,17' the court of appeals
denominated the claim as subject matter jurisdiction,' 75 and it was briefed
and argued before the Supreme Court as subject matter jurisdiction. 76
'
70 See id. at 1011.
'7' Id. at 1010-11.
172 Id. at 1011. He notes that, in any event, the district court had statutory jurisdiction
because continuing violations were alleged, which seems to go beyond his concurrence
in Gwaltney. See id. Moreover, Scalia claims that in Gwaltney Article III standing was
found. See id. His remarks in this regard are somewhat puzzling since the majority did
not address the standing issue and Scalia argued in his concurring opinion that, even
under Marshall's theory of the case, on remand the lower court should be directed to
inquire into the existence of plaintiffs' standing. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. 49, 70-71
(1987). Scalia perhaps meant that the standing issue was implicitly decided. See supra
note 169 and accompanying text.
"' See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss For Lack Of Jurisdiction at 4, Chesapeake Bay
Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542 (E.D. Va. 1985) (No. 84-
0366-R) (arguing that when no violation is ongoing § 505 "does not create jurisdiction of
the subject matter").
'
74 See Gwaltney 1, 611 F. Supp. 1542, 1547-1551 (E.D. Va. 1985).
'71 See Gwaltney 11, 791 F.2d 304, 308 (4th Cir. 1986).
,76 This is reflected in the brief of the United States in which the Solicitor General
outlined the matter succinctly:
Section 505 requires a citizen to allege, as an essential element of his
private enforcement action, that the defendant is failing to comply on a
continuous or intermittent basis with his permit requirements. That
allegation, when made in good faith and well grounded in fact (Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11), states a cause of action under Section 505 that falls within a
federal district court's subject matter jurisdiction .... As this Court has
observed, subject matter jurisdiction "is a question of whether a federal
court has the power, under the Constitution or laws of the United
States, to hear a case ...." Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n. 18
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Arguing that even if Gwaltney was correct that an ongoing
violation was requisite for subject matter jurisdiction under Clean Water
Act section 505, Scalia contends that it did not revise the Court's
"established jurisprudence that the failure of a cause of action does not
automatically produce a failure of jurisdiction.""' Nor did it adopt "the
expansive principle that a statute saying 'the district court shall have
jurisdiction to remedy violations [in specified ways]' renders the existence
of a violation necessary for subject-matter jurisdiction." '78 Justice Stevens,
Scalia wrote, "wishes to resolve, not whether EPCRA authorizes this
plaintiff to sue (it assuredly does), but whether the scope of the EPCRA
right of action includes past violation. Such a question, we have held,
goes to the merits and not to statutory standing."'79
One might argue that all of this is a contrived interpretation on
Scalia's part, because if the statutory question is not a jurisdictional one,
then standing and the "fascinating" doctrine of redressability can be
reached immediately. Unfortunately for citizen litigants, the redressability
issue became the key point in Steel Company. After spending an
inordinate amount of effort refuting Justice Stevens' contention that the
statutory issue might be addressed before the constitutional one, Scalia
disposed of the primary issue in short order, ruling that none of the relief
sought by plaintiff/respondent Would likely remedy its injury, and that
standing was therefore lacking.' 8° The principle relief sought, imposition
on the company of penalties payable to the federal Treasury for failing to
(1979). A citizen plaintiff must satisfy the conditions set forth in
Section 505 to state a cause of action falling within the federal court's
subject matter jurisdiction. To obtain relief, the citizen must also
demonstrate, of course, that he possesses standing to bring the action
and that he is entitled to an available remedy.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 15 & n.19,
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) (No.
86-473). The Solicitor further argued:
Section 505's use of the word "alleged" in conjunction with the phrase
"to be in violation" indicates that for purposes of satisfying the
statutory threshold, the question whether the citizen plaintiff has an
actionable claim-and likewise whether the district court may hear that
action-depends on the allegations contained in the complaint rather
than the proof eventually adduced at trial.
Id. at 16 n.23.
177 See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1011.
178 Id.
179 Id.
0 See id. at 1018-20.
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timely file required reports, would have provided no remediation of an
injury to the plaintiff in the Court's view, but instead served only to
vindicate an "undifferentiated public interest" in enforcement of the law.'8 '
The Court ruled this could not serve as a basis for standing.' 2 The impact
of this ruling is substantial since, by basing the ruling on a constitutional
interpretation, the Court undercut Congress' ability to provide citizens a
cause of action to seek penalties for past violations, thereby insulating past
unlawful conduct unaccompanied by present violations.83
In spite of this unfortunate outcome, it is Justice Scalia's analysis
of EPCRA section 11046 and conclusion that the statute did not address
,81 Id. at 1018.
82 Id. at 1018-20.
183 The pernicious impact of the decision has already been observed. In Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998), cert.
granted, 119 S.Ct. 1111 (1999), the Fourth Circuit, relying on Steel Company, reasoned
that redressability must continue to exist at every stage of review. See id. at 306.
Accordingly, it held that an action to enforce the Clean Water Act became moot on
appeal for lack of redressability because plaintiffs had not appealed the denial of their
requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, and thus the only potential relief available
at that time was the payment of penalties to the Treasury. See id. at 306. The court
therefore overturned the district court's verdict assessing a penalty of $405,800 against
the company for numerous violations of its wastewater discharge permit. See id. at 306-
07. It also noted that attorneys' fees would not be available to plaintiffs because they
were not substantially prevailing parties as required under the Act. See id. at 307 n.5
(citing 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(d) (West Supp. 1998)). The case has caused considerable
consternatio among environmentalists, and its outcome could have a substantial impact
on the future of citizen suits. See William Glaberson, Novel Antipollution Tool is Being
Upset by Courts, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1999, at Al.
Two district courts have followed Laidlaw in dismissing citizen suits. In San
Francisco Baykeeper v. Cargill Salt Division, No. C-96-02161-CAL (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2,
1998), the judge ruled that citizens can never seek civil penalties in any citizen suit
because the Supreme Court announced an "absolute rule of law" that penalties do not
redress a citizen's injuries. Order (Nov. 19, 1998) (on file with author). Subsequently,
the court in Dubois v. United States Dep 't of Agric., 20 F. Supp.2d 263 (D.N.H. 1998),
held that because the plaintiffs, by winning their claim for injunctive relief, had mooted
their claim for penalties. See id. at 268. The court reasoned that because it had enjoined
the defendant form further violations, "[a]bsent evidence of continuing misconduct, there
are no imminent violations of the [Clean Water Act] for civil penalties to deter." Id. at
268. Public interest attorney James Hecker noted that these cases create a framework
"where you can't get penalties if you either win or lose injunctive relief." See Letter
from James M. Hecker, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, to Ann Powers (Oct. 28, 1998)
(on file with author). This line of decisions could result in the citizen suit provisions
being reduced to a federal cause of action to abate a continuing nuisance, which by
statutory structure and legislative history is clearly not what Congress intended.
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subject matter jurisdiction in the same manner as section 505 of the Clean
Water Act that seems more accurate than Justice Stevens', and more
consistent with the jurisprudence. It may be the Gwaltney decision that
was, after all, an aberration, creating a "peculiar" and "eccentric" form of
subject matter jurisdiction.
IX. CONCLUSION
Justice Marshall was convinced that Congress meant what it said
when it used the "alleged to be in violation" phrase, a view that anyone
who has participated in the legislative drafting process may find
questionable."' But he perceived the jurisdictional debate in Gwaltney to
arise from the specific language of section 505, and thought it unlikely that
the decision would be relevant to statutes which did not contain the same
formulation.'85 Consequently, he might well have concurred with Scalia's
position on this point in Steel Company. Indeed, if Justice Scalia's
opinion in Steel Company is any indication, Gwaltney's jurisdictional
ruling may be reduced eventually to a narrow ruling on subject matter
jurisdiction based on the "peculiar" language of section 505, or even to
dicta. This might benefit citizen litigants when the jurisdictional sweep of
other citizen suit statutes is being considered, since arguably only under
statutes containing "alleged to be in violation" language is an on-going
violation necessary for jurisdiction. But what one hand giveth the other
taketh away, since an ongoing violation might have to be proven to prevail
on the merits, depending on how the statute is construed, and more
importantly, on what now appears to be required to meet the redressability
test for standing.",b Even if a court, in examining a citizen suit provision,
found that Congress did not intend to limit citizens to suits in which a
violation was ongoing, the Article III standing doctrine laid out in Steel
'84 The author has worked on legislative matters in numerous contexts, including as an
attorney with the Land and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department of Justice.
185 See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. 49, 64-67 (1987).
186 There appear to be at least six votes, and perhaps seven, for this standard. Scalia was
joined in his opinion by Rehnquist, Thomas, Kennedy and O'Connor. See Steel Co., 118
S. Ct. at 1008. Justice Breyer concurred in the part dealing with redressability. See id. at
1020-21. Justice Souter's position is not clear, since he joined Justice Stevens'
concurrence, except for the part dealing with redressability. See id. at 1021. Justice
Ginsburg did not join on that issue either, writing that she would follow Gwaltney, and
"resist expounding or offering advice on the constitutionality of what Congress might
have done, but did not do." Id. at 1032.
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Company would impose the same requirement, and arguably do so in a
fashion difficult for Congress to alter because of its constitutional
grounding.'87
In the final analysis, Gwaltney has raised substantial impediments
to citizen litigation, preventing some suits from being initiated or
maintained, and making all litigation more difficult and costly. Some of
the difficulties might have been ameliorated had the Court more carefully
crafted its opinion to spell out, as it did in some of its internal documents,
the standards imposed upon a citizen litigant in bringing and proving his
case. It raised issues that have not been adequately addressed by later
decisions and will continue to present difficulties for citizen litigators.
Beyond that, the decision imposed serious limitations on citizen suits
which do not constrain government prosecutions such as United States v.
Smithfield, and were not intended by Congress. As a consequence, it will
be critically important that the government's enforcement presence, as
reflected in the Department of Justice's recent prosecution of Smithfield
Foods, is strong and effective. Even so, the minimization of citizens'
ability to litigate important environmental cases is extremely unfortunate.
Citizen suits have been a crucial tool in curbing pollution and achieving
the present level of environmental compliance. Courts should exercise
care in limiting a mechanism with such a lengthy legal history, which
Congress deemed essential in protecting the environment and which has
proved so successful.
.87 It has been suggested that a citizen suit provision which provided even a nominal sum
to be paid directly to a prevailing plaintiff would remedy the redressability problem. See
Harold Feld, Saving the Citizen Suit: The Effect of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and the
Role of Citizen Suits in Envir-onmental Enlforcement, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 141, 178-
79 (1994). Justice Scalia's discussion of penalties in Steel Company appears to lend
support to this suggestion. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1018 (penalties under EPCRA
"might be viewed as a sort of compensation or redress to respondent if they were payable
to respondent").
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